Tuesday, 7 June 2016

Long Read: Operation Coldfeet - Skyhook & The Daring Raid on an Abandoned Soviet Ice Station

At the height of the Cold War the Soviets operated a network of floating ice stations across the Arctic region in order to monitor American maritime and submaritime activities. When the ice upon which these stations were sitting became too thin or broken up, they would be abandoned by their crews and left to drift amongst the ice floes alone. Alone, that is, until the US Navy found one.

In 1962 a naval reconnaissance aircraft flying an aeromagnetic survey over the Arctic Ocean reported spotting an abandoned Soviet drift station. A few days later, US intelligence learned that the Soviets had been forced to leave Station NP 9 when the ice runway used to supply it had cracked. The prospect of examining an abandoned Soviet listening post attracted the interest of the Office of Naval Research (ONR) who wanted to compare Soviet efforts with their own reconnaissance and monitoring operations. So they launched Operation Coldfeet - a daring intelligence raid on an enemy base in the wilds of the Arctic ice floes.

In the planning stages of the operation, the ONR soon realised NP9 was far too deep into the ice pack to be reached by an icebreaker or helicopter, so an alternative insertion method had to be found. During the second Wold War, America had perfected the parachute jump and almost 20 years later they could put a soldier any place at any time thanks to their airborne capabilities. It was decided that a two man team would parachute onto the station in order to gather as much intelligence about the Soviet operation as they could. Their extraction, though, would prove more difficult. The problem was never putting the men onto the ice, it was getting them off it. 

In response to this same problem during World War Two and the Korean war, The British and Americans had developed a method of extracting valuable assets and personnel via low flying aircraft, which would eventually become known as the All American System. A C47 transport plane trailing a snagline would fly low above the intended target and catch a wire strung between two poles by ground forces. In turn, the C47’s Loadmaster would winch in this line and pull the cargo or personnel attached to it on board as the aircraft climbed rapidly. While the method was generally a success, the Americans had never used it to extract agents from combat, though the British had reportedly employed the method several times to retrieve assets from deep in the field.

The nature of combat and espionage changed rapidly as the Cold War reared its head and one man saw an opportunity to develop The All American System into a man-portable escape method for downed pilots and agents in the field. Robert Fulton designed a system that used a helium filled dirigible-shaped weather balloon and 500 feet of reinforced nylon line that could be inflated and snagged by a Navy P2V plane. After rigorous testing, Fulton received a development contract from ONR's Air Programs Division and, over the next few years, went on to to develop the system to full operational capability. Fulton named his system Skyhook, and this seemed to provide the answer to the ONRs problem of getting their agents off NP9.

CIA Issued Fulton Instruction Card

The ONR scheduled the mission for September of 1962 in an effort to guarantee good weather and ample daylight. It was estimated that NP 9 would be drifting within 600 miles of the mission launch point at US Air Force base at Thule, Greenland. Two men were selected for the ground assignment, Maj. James Smith, an experienced paratrooper and Russian linguist who had served on US Drift Stations Alpha, and Charlie and Lt. Leonard A. LeSchack, a former Antarctic geophysicist. Although LeShack was not jump qualified, he attended the course at Lakehurst Naval Air Station jump school in order to take part in the mission.

Despite all this preparation, the Navy still hadn’t given Coldfeet the go ahead. Senior officers argued that the plan would never work and would likely cost the lives of Smith and LeShack. The mission was finally granted approval in late September, but this delay meant the operation would have to be launched in sub zero temperatures and poor conditions for flying. Further operational and technical problems meant the mission prep dragged on through out the winter with no resolution. In March 1962, American intelligence learned that the Soviets had abandoned a more up-to-date ice station, NP 8, in haste after a pressure ridge destroyed its ice runway. The Canadian Government readily agreed to the use of the Royal Canadian Air Force base at Resolute Bay, 600 miles from NP 8 and Operation Coldfeet was finally green-lighted.

The hunt for NP 8 began in perfect weather with the C-130 en route to the station’s last known position ready to commence a grid search at 10-mile intervals. However, the initial search turned up nothing. Over the following days, the C-130 searched at five-mile intervals but still it failed to reveal the location of NP 8. Captain Cadwalader called off the operation as the weather deteriorated and available flight time dwindled. The next monthly ice reconnaissance flight on 4 May spotted NP 8 well to the east of its predicted position and while the ONR remained convinced that Coldfeet was still viable, the funding for the project had almost run out. 

Fulton had been working with CIA on the development of Skyhook since the fall of 1961 and the Coldfeet team turned to them for assistance in carrying out the mission. The CIA already had a Fulton equipped B-17 and over the next six months, CIA-contract pilots flew numerous practice missions to perfect the equipment needed to infiltrate and extract agents. After $30,000 was made available by the Defense Intelligence Agency, Coldfeet was back in business with the CIA providing the Skyhook-equipped B-17 and a C-46 support aircraft for the project. 

CIA Skyhook Equipped B17

After days of searching the area, assisted by a P2V from Patrol Squadron One at Kodiak, the CIA B-17 finally located NP 8. The aircraft circled the station while Major Smith and Pickup Co-Ordinator John D. Wall selected a drop point. Drift streamers determined the wind, and then Smith parachuted from the aircraft followed by LeSchack. After dropping supplies to the men and receiving a favourable radio report from Smith, the B-17 departed, leaving the two to explore the station for the next 72 hours.

On the return journey to pickup Smith and LeShack the weather conditions worsened significantly. Warmer temperatures had caused a dense fog to form above the ice and, as a result, the crew were unable to locate NP 8. The B-17 was forced to return to Point Barrow. After a second fruitless search on 1 June, Cadwalader called out the P2V, which was able to locate the station using its more sophisticated navigational equipment to guide the trailing B-17 in by UHF/DF steers to the station.

Conditions for the pickup were far from ideal; surface winds were blowing at 30 knots and visibility was almost at zero. Smith and LeSchack attached the balloon to their 150 pounds of exposed camera film, documents, and equipment, using their bodyweight to prevent the cargo from being blown away. After circling the station, the B-17 attempted to collect LeSchack. Smith had to struggle to hold LeSchack from being blown away in the gale and as his rising balloon caught the wind, LeSchack tore away from Smith's grasp and was dragged face down across the ice. After 300 feet, his progress was stopped by an ice block and he was eventually lifted into the air. Alone on the ice, Smith inflated the last balloon and held tightly to a tractor. Nevertheless, the wind started to drag him across the ice until he managed to catch a crack with his heels and the B-17 snagged his ascending line, dragging him upwards into the clouds where he was finally brought into the aircraft by the winch operator.

LeShack and Smith aboard the B17 after retrieval

The intelligence gathered by the Coldfeet team proved to be of great value to the US. The ONR learned that the Soviet station was configured to operate for extended periods of time in total silence, confirming the importance that the Soviets attached to acoustical work. Equipment and documents obtained from NP 8 showed that Soviet polar research was far superior to US efforts. While the Skyhook system provided an important asset for all manner of intelligence operations, its usefulness was  undermined by the development of long range helicopters during the 1960s. Still, it appears likely that Fulton's Skyhook did find employment in a number of specialized clandestine operations following Coldfeet, though its subsequent use by CIA and the military services remains shrouded in secrecy.


Images courtesy of CIA.gov and original painting in lead image by Keith Woodcock

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